In evaluating joint actions among individuals, or-hostile) players may or may not follow the same ganizations, or countries, economists usually as-lines suggested in game theory models. For exsume that players are economically rational, have ample, Shubik (1982) concludes that modeling agfreedom of choice, and, in the case of organiza-gregates as a single player presents difficulties, estions or countries, that each "speaks with one pecially in international politics, where representvoice." Then, economically optimal solutions to ing a country as a single player can be dangerously allocation problems, under rational behavior of the misleading. Also, if the allocation is to be conagents, can be found. Approaches include competi-ducted among players with some level of hostility, tive, noncooperative, and cooperative solutions. political considerations, which are usually not inFor example, using n-person cooperative game corporated in economic analysis, can hinder or theory in the characteristic function form, coopera-even block the most efficient arrangement. These tion among players occurs if and only if there are political considerations can impact relations economic benefits from cooperation realized by among individuals, economic sectors, groups each player, by subcoalitions of players, and by the within a nation or state, or the nations themselves. grand coalition that includes all players. This apOften, particularly when a level of hostility exproach also fulfills efficiency requirements ists among players, economic and political analythrough economically driven allocations. Such ses of a possible transaction will reach different, analyses usually refer to a just and fair distribution and sometimes diametrically opposite, concluof scarce resources or to gains from a transfer (re-sions. For example, a suggested solution to the distribution) of scarce resources, or to construction Ganges River Basin water allocation problem beof joint facilities and allocation of their costs tween India, Bangladesh, and Nepal (Rogers 1993) among users.
demonstrates the big economic advantages in reCooperation among political (and sometimes gional cooperation. Perhaps political considerations not included in many of the suggested solu-larger coalitions was highly unlikely, but also that size the importance of political or even aesthetic the most likely political course of action was the and emotional aspects of water allocation. The vast status quo, with no cooperation at all. literature associated with the political aspects of When acknowledging each other at all, econo-water transfer is mainly restricted to specific case mists and political analysts have usually sufficed studies, with a limited economic interpretation rewith a passing comment or a footnote recognizing garding the water conflict. the concerns of the other. Here we distinguish be- LeMarquand (1977) provides a general conceptween the "economic--the efficient allocation of tual framework for handling international river cowater in consideration of its benefits and costsoperation. The model identifies three sets of factors and the "political"-the organization of power to that establish general patterns of incentives and achieve some action in relation to the resource (of-disincentives for cooperation. The three sets are the ten resulting in "inefficient" distribution). This hydrologic-economic relations among the potential paper proposes a framework by which both eco-cooperators, the foreign policy of each potential nomic and political considerations are included in cooperator (regarding relevant issues), and the doa unified model for evaluating allocation, transfer, mestic policy and consensus of each potential coor trade of scarce resources. This method quanti-operator. The hydrologic-economic set can be operator. The hydrologic-economic set can be fies both the economic payoffs of a number of viewed as a necessary condition for cooperation. possible coalitions and players, using n-person co-Then foreign policy which is affected by domestic operative game theory, and the political likelihood may decay or enhance this of any of the coalitions actually forming, using the cooperation. This framework does not ince an cooperation. This framework does not include an PRINCE Political Accounting System (Coplin and  rtant •.
• cooperator to prevent the establishment of other to adjust the measure of efficient distribution by . p incorporating both the economic and political con-poah i its lack of ntial d rawback of this apsiderations of a potential transaction.
proach is ts lack of quantitative measurements for siderations of a potential transacticalon. cthe various factor sets and variables used. The The next section discusses political consider-model has been applied to four case studies. ations and their quantification. The following sec-mdel as een a ed to for cse sies tion presents several n-person game theory allocaEndtner (1987) measured differences in watertion concepts, used for resource allocation, and related cultural ideologies of Native Americans their rationales, drawbacks, and applications. The and Mormon anglers in order to explain the politicombined political-economic approach is devel-cal economy of water development in Utah. Using oped in the fourth section and applied in the subse-a vector of cultural symbols and meanings of water quent section to a case study wherein a potential for both parties, Endtner estimated the Robinsonwater transfer in the western Middle East is con-Brainerd coefficient of similarity for nine topics sidered. In order to alleviate detrimental water concerning water ideology. The results suggest that deficits among the riparians of the Jordan River, the Mormons and the Native Americans agree to we examine the possibility of one or a series of some extent on most practical uses of water but water transfers from the Nile basin, where water-show dramatic differences on cultural and legal saving technology might be exchanged for the wa-topics. The study concludes that the cultural ideter that is saved. In this setting, we investigate both ologies of both Native American and Mormon anthe political considerations that would lead to the glers have biased their responses to reforms in wacoalitions necessary to implement the transfer and ter laws (e.g., water projects or water markets) in the economic results of each possible coalition.
directions that are not economically desired by While water is examined in the international set-them. ting, it should be noted that the method has potenAn approach employing differences in beliefs tial application to a wide variety of resource allo-and attitudes regarding water on the part of water cation problems, regardless of the resource in ques-users and regulatory-agency personnel is develtion, the number or classification of players, or the oped and applied in a case study of water-permit political relations among them. allocation in Florida (Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Wilson 1991) . The model consists of several belief and Water Conflicts and Politics attitude statements that provide measures on a Likert scale. The differences between the responses of This section reviews the interaction between eco-the water-permit applicants and those of agency nomic methods and some of the noneconomic tools personnel to the belief and attitude statements are that have been used in the literature to evaluate used to measure potential conflict. Although the water scarcity issues. Noneconomic tools empha-approach provides a cardinal rating of conflict lev-els, it does not assign economic values to the ac-n-Person Cooperative Game Theory tivities of the players involved in the water alloca-Approaches to Resource Allocation tion.
A Political Accounting System (PAS) to quan-Game theory is one approach extensively used to titatively and qualitatively predict interactions determine a fair and efficient allocation of comamong entities (Coplin and O'Leary 1974 , 1976 , mon resources, costs, or payoffs. Fairness is ad-1983 is also used in the political science literature. dressed by allocating according to the contribution The first element of this system is the issue posi-of a player to the incremental gains of the common tion, which expresses the strength of each partici-(group, region, etc.).l The relevant game cost alpant's (player's) position for or against each of the location methods have been discussed in many issues. A second element is the power of a player publications. Shubik (1982) provides a thorough to influence an issue, that is, the ability of each review of various solution concept applications player to accomplish or to prevent the occurrence and their relevance to real world situations. He of particular outcomes on each issue. The third concludes that applications of game theoretic soelement in the PAS is salience, the importance lutions may face difficulties in cases where there each player attaches to a particular issue.
are diseconomies of scale, or where the price sysTwo problems may affect the application of the tem does not exist. Dinar, Ratner, and Yaron PAS approach. First, the measure of the values to (1992) evaluate the reasonableness and acceptabilbe included in the PAS is, in many cases, subjec-ity of cooperative game allocation solutions based tive, ordinal (although normalized), and possibly on two extensive water resource case studies. Their inconsistent. Second, this approach does not con-main conclusions are that use of utility functions sider coalitional arrangements among the players. may lead to problems in gains allocation, and that The approach does not guarantee an outcome that the allocations are heavily dependent on probabiliwill satisfy all potential players since each player ties of coalition formation in the case of the Shapimplicitly maximizes its own objectives (issues). ley value and the generalized Shapley value. However, the PAS does provide a baseline for Allocation schemes suggested in the literature comparison between possible political likelihoods on cooperative game theory in the characteristic of coalitional formations and is used here.
form include the core (Shubik 1982), the Shapley Naff and Matson (1984) and Frey and Naff value (Shapley 1953) , and the generalized Shapley (1985) apply a similar approach to water conflicts value (Loehman and Whinston 1976; Loehman et in the Middle East. Their approach consists of al. 1979). These schemes are relatively easy to three components: (1) motivation to participate implement (Young 1985) and were selected to be (potential benefits); (2) riparian position regarding used in the case study discussed in this paper. the water; and (3) power to prevent any coalitional To set the theoretical framework for a regional arrangement. Subjective weights ranging from one allocation game, assume a resource such as a river (weak) to five (strong) are assigned to each com-or a groundwater aquifer that may be shared, under ponent for each party (player). A summation over certain arrangements, among different users in the the weights by entity provides the total ranking for region. Using game theory terminology, the potenthe players involved. Interpretation of the results tial users are players, groups of the players are suggests that the more uniform the ranking, the coalitions, and the various possible allocation arhigher the potential for conflict.
rangements are a game. Let N be the set of all the None of the approaches incorporates economic players in the regional game, S the set of all feaconsiderations into the cooperation process. There sible coalitions in the game, and s (s e S) a feasible is also no attempt to evaluate the cooperative coalition in the game. The noncooperative coaliagreement (allocation of the joint cost or benefits) tions are {j}, j = 1, 2,..., n, and the grand coamong the participants. Such approaches are there-alition is {N}.
fore limited in their application.
Games may be of a cost nature or of a net inWe suggest here an approach that combines eco-come allocation nature. In both cases the incentive nomic and political considerations while evaluat-to cooperate is the lower cost or the higher net ing potential for regional cooperation. The sug-income to the player that is associated with coopgested approach allows us to assess quantitatively eration. In the case of cost allocation, the objective both the likelihood of a given cooperative project is to minimize the joint cost, and in the case of to occur and the allocation of the associated benefits among the cooperators. The suggested approach combines game theory principles with poThe interested reader can find a comprehensive discussion on the litical science assessment methods.
application of game theort in Shubik (1982, ch. 12).
income allocation, the objective is to maximize the allocation set. The core provides a bound for the joint net income. In both cases the value of the maximum allocation each player may request. In game objective function is called the "value." Let this respect, it is an overall solution for many alfS be the value of any coalition s of the region's location schemes (such as the ones considered players. In practice, fS is maximized over the sum later) that are contained within the core. Let o i j be of all j players in coalition s and in any noncoop-player j's allocation of the incremental net income erative coalition {j} subject to available endow-from the regional game. The core fulfills requirements of the joint resource: ments for individual and group rationality; that is, the core solution for each player is preferable to the (1) maxf"= Rj V se S. noncooperative outcome and to participation in j" Spartial coalitions. The core also fulfills requireHere f" is the value of the objective function of ments for joint efficiency (Shubik 1982) ; that is, all coalition s, and R I is the payoff function of player costs or gains are allocated: j while participating in coalition s. Arrangements can be made in the game to allow a player to use (4) (o -v({j}) Vje N, more of the resource and to compensate other players by side payments.
Regional cooperation, according to the above (5)
The Regional Cooperative Game The system (4), (5), and (6) has more than one allocation solution. A method of calculating the The regional optimization model in equation (2) extreme points of the core (Shapley 1971) calcucan be interpreted as a cooperative game, with side lates the incremental contributions of each player payments, and described in terms of a characteris-when joining any existing coalition, and assigns tic function. The value of a characteristic function these contributions to that player. for any coalition expresses the coalition's gains,
The Shapley Value. While the core may contain assuming efficient behavior of coalition members. more than one allocation, the Shapley value is a Equation (3) defines the characteristic function unique allocation scheme. The Shapley value of a normalized game in which players of coalition scheme allocates 90 to each player based on the s allocate only the additional net income derived weighted average of its contributions to all posfrom cooperation: sible coalitions and sequences. In the calculation process, an equal probability is assigned for the
formation of any coalition of the same size, assumjes ing also all possible sequences of formation. where v(s) is the value of the characteristic function for coalition s in terms of incremental net in- (7) (n-
Allocation Schemes V N where n is the number of players in the game, and The purpose of this section is to evaluate, using Isl is the number of members in coalition s. different allocation schemes, the acceptability, to
The Generalized Shapley Value. The Shapley the players, of the outcomes of the regional game value has been criticized for assuming equal probwhen reallocation of regional cooperative gains is abilities to all coalition formations. The generalconsidered. At this stage no ideological or political ized Shapley value refers to a subset of practical considerations affect the creation of any coalition coalitions only, and the probability of a coalition arrangement. Three allocation schemes will be occurring depends on the logical sequence of its considered: the core, the Shapley value, and the formation. Like the Shapley value, the generalized generalized Shapley value.
Shapley value assigns to each player the weighted The Core. The core of an n-cooperative game in average of its contributions to all coalitions realisthe characteristic function form is a set of game tically formed. The generalized Shapley allocation allocation gains that is not dominated by any other to player j, 6O, is (8) conflicts, when quantitative political models do exe= P (s, s -{j}) [v(s -J})] V je N, ist, they generally use the same parameters as those jEsEs of the PAS. As noted earlier, Frey and Naff (1985) = Ps
suggest a method for assessing water disputes where Pb(s, s -("physPclS l s -}im)i P(s babiity) through a like method, and Lowi (1993) lists simithe probability ("physical-economic probability) lar parameters as those particularly relevant to riof player j joining coalition thSlaesg.
parians in her assessment of water conflicts in the It is assumed so far that the players in the game Middle East and Southeast Asia. are economically rational. This means that the de-E c som l of o cision of each player to join a given coalition is Whileoa e some f enthusas quantitative political analysis in general, and the based only on the incremental net income it resubjective nature of the PAS in elementary and subjective nature of the PAS in ceives by joining that coalition. However, in view a lar e ee tat i rmances are far of the literature reviewed earlier, ideological and bette than othe approaches. Therefore, its inclupolitical considerations should be included in the.
. modeling framework. The probabilities used in the sion in the model is a useful first step in an attempt modeling framework. The probabilities used min the onomist and the poShapley value and in the generalized Shapley value to bride the wrlds o te re not using the S as allocations ignore these aspects. They do not ini iea aping ts et elude players indirectly involved in the game, and edii tool, but ae, ine, applying is reul as guidelines to help unify economic efficiency they also do not address ideological and policy and plit considerations determining what considerations that affect the political agenda of a kind of redistribution of resources would be regiven player.
quired for hostile players to overcome their reluctance to cooperate), we feel the inclusion of the PAS in this context is justified.
Political Probabilities of Coalition Formation
The PAS assumes that the political impact of players on joint decisions is affected by three facIt is recognized that economics and politics play tors: (1) the extent to which each player supports, interactive roles-sometimes complementary, opposes, or is neutral toward each joint decision sometimes contradictory-in the evaluation of re-(issue position); (2) how effective each player source allocations, yet neither paradigm is autono-might be in blocking or enabling the joint decision mous. Just as political considerations can effec-(power); and (3) how important the joint decision tively veto a project with an otherwise favorable is to each player (salience). economic outcome, a project with potential reAs described by Coplin and O'Leary (1974, gional-welfare improvements might influence the 1976, 1983 ), players to be included in the political political decision-making process to allow the nec-analysis should be those that directly and indirectly essary cooperation. Although the process of inter-impact the joint decision. 3 Let i E N and m E M be, action between economics and politics is dynamic respectively, players likely to directly and to indiin nature and evolves over time, it will be analyzed rectly impact the joint decision. For each player i E here in a static framework. Furthermore, we exam-s c N u M, a value of each political factor (k = 1, ine only the political likelihood that any of the 2, 3 for issue position, power, and salience, respecpreviously described coalitions may be formed for tively) can be quantified. the purpose of the resource allocation.
Values for issue position (indexed by k = 1) are We will use the PRINCE Political Accounting in the range [-X 1 , + Xi], where negative values System (PAS) developed by Coplin and O'Leary express opposition, a zero value expresses neutral- (1974, 1976, 1983) to calculate political probabili-ity, and positive values express support. Larger abties for the formation of different coalitions. The solute values are associated with higher levels of PAS is a technique for assessing the impact of a support or opposition. Note that each value for given player on joint policy decisions. Quantifica-power and salience (indexed by k = 2 and k = 3, tion of political projections has not been particu-respectively) is in the range [1, Xk] V k = 2, 3. larly prevalent in the academic world, although it Again, larger values represent higher levels of seems to thrive when real-world political decisions power and salience, respectively. need to be made. The PAS, for example, is the basis for an annual handbook of country and po-2 See, for example, Ascher (989) for a thorough critique of the litical risk analysis (Coplin and O'Leary 1994) and PRINCE method and other expert systems for political-economic forea comparative study of international political risk casting, and Howell and Chaddick (1994) for another thorough analysis of several political models that concludes that the PAS performs best.
analysis (Howell and Chaddick 1994) . A necessary condition for comparability is that (13) every Xk should be normalized so that Vs.
1989), water from the Nile River will be diverted I Yi(s)l through the eastern Sinai Peninsula to southern IL '~~~~i ~(the Negev Region). According to Dinar and Wolf e n r i s te sm of te tl e t (1994), a water-saving technology 5 will be sold by The nominator includes the sum of the total effect IL to EG in exchange for part of the water that will of the players in support of the joint decision and be in E art of th we wil repace the be saved in EG. Part of this water will replace the half of the effect of those who are neutral. In the amount originally conveyed from northern IL absence of other information, neutral players are o t rn te through the Israeli National Carrier to the Negev. assumed to be equally likely either to support or t Ngv assued to e eually liely either to support or Part of the water saved in northern IL will be sent to oppose s in the future (Coplin and O'Leary to oppose s in the future (Coplin and O'Leary to the WB. Another part of the saved Nile water 1983). Therefore, .Y(s) in the case of i' (s) = 0 is.
Another part of the saved Nile water 1983 )weif.
The cen ofina sor i s will augment the demand for water in the GS. For given a weight of -. The denominator includes the given a weit of . The den nator includes the simplicity, assume also that allocation of this water absolute value all players effectshas been determined exogenously to the system Since the numerator is less than or equal to the committee, or by a treaty); (say, by an international committee, or by a treaty); denominator, we obtain 0 < (s) ' 1, which is denominator, we obtain '0 • (s) -1, which is that is, a fixed, agreeable amount of water 6 will be defined as the political probability that a joint de-s sold (in the case of a regional arrangement) by EG cision s will be adopted, or, in our case, that co-to GS and IL, and by IL to WB The price is alition s will be formed.
determined endogenously in the model, using calculated values of marginal productivity for water.
Reallocation of the Regional Gains
The potential number of coalitional arrangements in the region is 2 4 -1 = 15. They include:
(a) the current noncooperation case {EG}, {IL}, The generalized Shapley value is modified to ac-{GS}, {WB}; (b) partial-cooperation cases {EG; count for the likelihood of political formation of the possible coalitions. This is done for each coalition by multiplying the physical-economic probalition by multiplying the physical-economic probFor simplification we exclude several countries, such as Jordan, that abilities P(s, s-{j}), calculated in the generalized could potentially participate in a more comprehensive regional arrangeShapley value, by the political probabilities t(s). ment (Kally 1989 GS}, {EG; WB}, {EG; IL}, {IL; GS}, {IL; WB}, may not be stable enough, or may not exist at all. {GS; WB}, {EG; GS; WB}, {EG; IL; GS}, {EG; In order to "correct" for the instability embodied IL; WB}, {IL; GS; WB}; and (c) the grand coali-in the regional optimization solution, and to make tion case {EG; GS; IL; WB}. cooperation more attractive to some players, the Because of physical conditions in the region incremental regional net income is considered for (and only for these considerations), at least three redistribution using alternative allocation schemes. coalitions-{EG; WB}, {GS; WB}, and {EG; GS;
The Core. The core equations for the regional WB}-can be excluded a priori because of eco-game are nomic inferiority (e.g., an inability to support expensive energy costs to pump water from the Ne-oj > 0 j = EG, IL, GS, WB gev to WB). Therefore, for practical purposes the number of coalitions in the regional game is 12.
)EG + (tIL - 
90.70
The characteristic values of the coalitions are the incremental gains to a particular coalition in the COEG + ()GS > 8.00 game (see table 1 for regional gains distribution). These gains are to be distributed among the players oEG + tIL + oGS -96.30 participating in the game. As the major player (it holds the water in the regional game), EG is not CEG + "IL + (OWB 120.90 likely to favor such distribution of the regional= 12 gains because it does not fully reflect EG's politi-+ IL+ GS+ WB cal power over the Nile water. If redistribution of This system of equations has more than one althese gains is not considered, the regional solution location. A method of calculating the extreme points of the core (Shapley 1971) was applied tion, is scored on a scale of 1 to 3. 7 This measure (table 2). The extreme points of the core are in-also includes a summation of internal forces, many terpreted as the players' preference. Each of the of which are described by Endtner (1987) . players will prefer allocations that are closer to
Developing reliable values for the Political Acthe extreme points of the core. The four left-counting System is a complicated task. Any estihand columns of table 2 are the maximum pos-mate of political viability is, by nature, subjective. sible allocations to the players, while the right-Coplin and O'Leary (1976) suggest only that by hand side of the table shows the coalition forma-dividing overall political viability into the compotion sequences leading to these allocations. The nents of issue position, power, and salience, as results shown in table 2 suggest that the ne-described earlier, one can make a more systematic gotiation set in this game is quite large. EG and IL and perhaps as a consequence more objective ascan each claim up to $126.5 million; the maximum sessment. They do not, however, offer a systematic value for GS is $8.0 million, and for WB it is $30.2 methodology for assessing each component Xk million.
These values can be estimated in various empirical The Shapley Value. Using equation (7) and the ways (surveys, referendums, committees) or can be results shown in table 1, the Shapley allocation of left to the subjective decision of the analyst. the regional gains is Oj = (57.7, 56.4, 2.4, 10.0), to Several political analysts have tackled the ques-EG, IL, GS, and WB, respectively (values are in tion of quantifying political viability in a similar millions of dollars). The Shapley allocation is con-manner. Meltsner (1972), for example, argues for tained within the core of the game and is also con-breaking viability into its components, but allows sistent with the maximum claim values computed that "the investigation of political feasibility ... in table 2. That is, EG and IL receive similar allo-depends on the role of the analyst, his political cations, and GS receives an allocation that is 24% knowledge, and the scope of his policy problems." of that for WB, which is consistent with the core In their discussion of "strategic management," maximum value allocations (8.0 compared with Nutt and Backoff (1987, p. 237 ) present a matrix to 30.2 for GS and WB, respectively).
help guide the analyst in determining similar paThe Generalized Shapley Value. Figure 1 depicts rameters, offering a ranking system to identify the conditional physical-economic probabilities of stakeholders as "low priority," "antagonists," coalition formation. Coalitions initiated by each "problematic," and "advocates," but suggest player are identified, and the conditional probabili-only that arriving at such categories requires "exties of each coalition formation are calculated and tended discussions." presented along the branches. The identified coa-
The values assigned to the political components litions are those that appear in table 2. Using equa-of the PAS in this paper are our best quantitative tion (8), the data in table 1, and the values in figure assessment of an elusive quantity. We recognize 1, the generalized Shapley allocation of the re-the need to develop more objective measures for gional gains is 0 i = (53.8, 49.5, 5.2, 16.5) to EG, each component of political viability. One option IL, GS, and WB, respectively, might quantify a combination of military might The Generalized Shapley Value with Modified and legal bearing as a gauge of power, for exProbabilities (GSVMP). The PAS is used now to ample, or the amount of public posturing over an estimate the probability that a given coalition will issue as manifested in news releases as a measure be established. The PAS will be used here to evalu-of either issue position, or salience. Another, more ate a player's level of support for or opposition to common option, used particularly in the absence of joining a given coalition. The PAS components, data necessary for a quantitative assessment, is to which were described generally earlier, are as fol-substitute iterations of "expert opinions," first delows. (1) Issue position, which summarizes all in-scribed by Gordon and Helmer (1964) as the Delteral forces of a player, is scored on a scale of -3 phi method.
8 Experts familiar with the technical to +3 (including 0). When applied to hydropolitics, and political landscapes of a particular issue might this measure is equivalent to a quantitative sum-be asked to rank the viabilities of available options mation of LeMarquand's factors (1977) . (2) Power, which summarizes a player's ability to enforce or implement its position, is scored on a scale ofor 1 to 3. hen appli ed to hydropolitics, power
The scale of 1 to 3 indicates low, medium, and high values. In the case of issue position, the range also includes 0, which means indifferreflects legal water rights and riparian positions as ence. Different scales could have also been chosen (e.g., 1 to 5), but the well as more traditional aspects, such as military or relative values of the PAS results would not be affected.
<.~~~~~~~~economic strength. (3)/
Seeee e ee Linstone and Turoff (1975) for a good summary of the strengths, economic strength. (3) Salience, which reflects th e weaknesses, and applications of the Delphi method; and Needham and de importance to a player of being in a given coaliLog (1990) for its applicability to water resources planning. on a consistent scale. The relative importance of ability that the coalition {IL; EG; GS} will be the viability measures themselves should also be formed from {IL; EG} is also .32. Therefore, the weighted for that particular issue during a particu-probability that these coalitions will not be formed lar time frame. A variation on the weighting pro-but will remain at the root coalition {IL; EG} stage cess is first described in detail in ]. Using equation (13), the goe (1965). However, one should keep in mind that data in table 3, and the values in figure 2 , the the experts' findings are stylized in the sense that reallocation of the regional gains, according to the the experts are not the players directly involved in GSVMP, is Oj = (77.3, 35.6, 4.1, 9.5) for EG, IL, the particular problem. GS, and WB, respectively. Using the PAS approach, once every component
In attempt to validate our findings for political is evaluated for each player participating in each viability, we compared our values for the options coalition, multiplication across rows in table 3 will described here with the values arrived at by the give a measure of a player's overall level of sup-five members of the Middle East Water Commisport or opposition to a proposed coalition. Adding sion for similar water resources alternatives. 9 The these values for each actor involved will provide a commission assessed alternatives to increase supranking value for the coalition as a whole, which ply and decrease demand for water resources in can be compared with the values for other coali-countries riparian to the Jordan River watershed. tions. A higher number reflects greater likelihood Those values were derived through a modified of support.
Delphi process, averaging subjective values asUsing the same approach, the PAS provides an signed by the members of the commission at a absolute measure for estimating the likelihood that meeting in June 1994, as described in Wolf and a coalition will be established (equation [12] ). Murakami (1995) . The Nine-Gaza/Israel water Table 3 also presents the political probabilities as-pipeline alternative was assessed by the commissociated with each coalition. For purposes of this sion members at a rate of more than 50% for techanalysis we use the information in Dinar and Wolf nical and economic feasibilities, but at only 7% for (1994b) for determining these values. The resulting political feasibility. While the methodologies used political probabilities of 0.23, 0.89, 0.64, 0.64, are different, the findings in our study were similar 0.73, 0.0, 0.0, and 0.0 represent, respectively, the to these in Wolf and Murakami, so that we feel that probabilities for formation of the coalitions {EG; our assessments of political viability were corrobo-IL}, {EG; GS}, {EG; IL; GS}, {EG; IL; WB}, rated. {EG; IL; GS; WB}, {IL; WB}, {IL; GS}, and {IL;
In comparing the different allocation schemes WB; GS}. The last three coalitions have been as-(see table 4), one observes that all are included signed probabilities of 0.0 since there is no physi-within the core of the regional game and are therecal possibility for cooperation among them in fore considered to be efficient allocations. The terms of water surplus. Likewise, it is recognized changes in the allocations of the regional gains that among hostile actors, the most likely scenario from cooperation-starting with the regional ecois for players not to overcome their hostility. nomic model (6.6, 112.55, 4.00, 3.35) and moving Therefore, each status quo noncooperation coali-through the Shapley value (57.7, 56.4, 2.4, 10.0), tion-{EG}, {IL}, {GS}, and {WB}-is given a the generalized Shapley value (63.7, 45.8, 2.8, probability of 1.00.
14.2), and finally the generalized Shapley value The conditional political-physical-economic with modified probabilities (77.3, 35.6, 4.1, 9.5)-probabilities are then calculated by multiplying the suggest that the GSVMP allocation is the most physical-economic probabilities in figure 1 by the likely to be stable of all the allocations. corresponding political probabilities in table 3. The Based on the GSVMP allocation, EG gets closmodified probabilities are shown in figure 2. It est to the maximum payoff allocation it considers should be noticed that the modified probabilities fair, according to the core allocations. IL's alloca-(figure 2) are smaller than those in figure 1. The tion drops significantly compared with its allocaprobability values in figure 2 should be interpreted tion in the regional economic solution, but few in the following way: values along the branches could believe that IL's share in the regional gains emanating from the same root indicate the prob-should be so high, even higher than those allocated abilities that the subcoalitions will be created. Sub-to EG. tracting the aggregated probability value from 1
Given the role of WB in the regional game, it is indicates the probability of remaining in the root coalitional stage. For example, the probability that caliona^l stage. ForT exampl, Til powill be formed a
The work of the Middle East Water Commission, a research body of the branch coalition { IL; EG; WB } will be formed the International Water Resources Association, is described in Biswas from root coalition {IL; EG} is .32, and the prob-and Wolf (1994) . To assess the stability of the allocation solutions than those for GS. The main reason is that WB's we follow Dinar and Howitt (1997) and apply the participation allows IL to save a substantial elec-Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik tricity cost, which would otherwise be required to 1954): send water from northern Israel to the Negev. The GS allocation determined by the GSVMP is better (14) x i -v(i) than the one determined by the regional economic= model.
i Xi -v(i) Sensitivity Analysis of the k i' k (s) Values Used in jN the Calculation of the Political Probabilities. The The power index compares the gains to a particular integration of measurable economic variables with player with the gains to the coalition. A more harthe subjective political factors is not without partial monized power distribution is more likely to yield remedy, at least. To evaluate the effects of the a stable coalition. Therefore, the coefficient of values presented in the analysis for the political variation of the power distribution Sa = rJ/ a is a variables, on the final GSVMP allocation, and to measure of stability for each allocation, where ora establish respective bounds on the results, a sensi-is the variance and a is the mean value of oa. The tivity analysis was conducted. The sensitivity greater the value of Sa, the larger the instability of analysis referred to the issue position component in the allocation solution. Table 6 presents the stabilthe PAS matrix. Issue position is the component ity measures of the various allocation solutions. that can most easily be affected by coalitional As can be seen from the table, the allocation setup, while the power and the salience compo-according to the economic model alone is the most nents are less likely to be affected by a coalitional unstable. The game theoretic allocations are far setting. Egypt and Sudan's values were selected for more stable, with the GSVMP being the most demonstration of the sensitivity analysis. Among stable and the Shapley being the least stable. the players involved, Egypt is the most likely to be In comparing the Shapley value with the GSV associated with a range of issue position values, and the GSVMP when dealing with regional coopgiven both its important role in the game and its eration, one needs to address the reasonableness of opportunities for gains from the game, on one the regional arrangements based also on the calcuhand, and the domestic politics situation it faces, lation of possible allocations of such arrangements. on the other hand. Sudan has both an existing water For example, using only the Shapley value, which allocation and claims for more water from the Nile. assumes equal probability for the formation of Sudan's issue position may vary based on its gen-each coalition, may result in allocations that overeral relationship with Egypt and Ethiopia. For estimate the allocation of benefits to some players these reasons, the issue positions range of values while underestimating it for other players. The for Egypt and Sudan will be used in the sensitivity GSV addresses this issue by taking into account analysis.
coalition arrangements that are impossible, for exThe sensitivity analysis is based on values in ample, because of physical constraints, such as in table 3. Modifications have taken into account the the case of water conveyance, a mountain that range of possible issue position values. Then the blocks a coalition among players on the two sides low and high values of the political probabilities of that mountain. However, the GSV, assuming (table 5) have been incorporated into the coalition rational players, does not address wider political formation sequence (as was the case of the base considerations, such as disagreement on other is- Targets  Israel  +2  +2  2  3  +12  +12  Gaza  +1  +1  1  2  +2  +2  West Bank  +1  +1  1  2  +2  +2  Total  +14  +28 aOnly the partial and grand coalitions are affected and presented.
sues, or long-term hostility between some players, sources in the Ganges Basin exist among India, that affects the probability of coalition formation. Bangladesh, and Nepal (Rogers 1993), it cannot For example, although physical and economic materialize since there are both domestic opposiprospects for cooperation over sharing water re-tion for such cooperation within one party and hos- ' model is not necessary; an alternative might be to which ultimately lead to no cooperation.
Using the same token, when only political con-use the transferred come to improve water-use siderations are included in the evaluation of pos-efficiencyin Egypt sible cooperation arrangements, without identify-A drawback of our approach the use of "almost subjective" considerations for proposal ing economic and physical feasibility, the coopera-m tive" consiertios for proposl '. . • Aevaluation. This problem results from the need to tion between the parties involved either will be . e t suboptimal (not related to the actual issue consid-combine quantitative (economic) and qualitative ered for cooperation) or will lead to the status quo. (polcal) measures in the analysis Although we showed by conducting a sensitivity analysis that For example, five Central Asian states considered conductg a sensitivity analysis that .•~ .A~~ .~ A
• the GSVMP results are reasonably stable as issue cooperating in order to reduce the negative envi-t G r a position values change, future research should foronmental impact on the region of the diversion of p on values change, future research should fothe Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya Rivers. The heads cus on quantifying political and ideological conthe Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya Rivers. The heads siderations to be compatible with economic ones. of states, recognizing the need for action, agreed in derations to be compatible with economic ones. 1992 to cooperate (World Bank 1994). However, The Nile River is considered here as the only so far only political considerations have been ad-source of surplus water. The cost associated with the cross-desert canal are believed by some redressed (since no feasible projects with identified the cros-desert canal are believed by some rebenefits to each state have been agreed upon ye). searchers to be high enough to allow the introducbenefits to each state have been agreed upon yet).
rTherefore, the only allocattion of other new sources of water that were ecois still based on the former Soviet scheme, which is nomally inferior to the alternative discussed in the inferior status quo solution. the paper. In addition, there is an emerging regional dialogue between Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, and seven other riparian countries on issues concerning reallocation of the Nile River water. AlDiscussion though such development may eliminate the exclusivity status that Egypt possesses in the game, it Economic efficiency alone is not a sufficient con-still leaves open many regional cooperation oppordition for cooperation, especially when that coop-tunities, some of which were discussed in this paeration is related to the transfer of a scarce resource per. among hostile potential cooperators. Therefore, wider political considerations should be incorporated into the analysis as well. 
